We 
Introduction
The notion of commitment is central in cryptographic protocol design. Often described as the "digital" analogue of sealed envelopes, commitment schemes enable a party, known as the sender, to commit itself to a value while keeping it secret from the receiver. This property is called hiding. Furthermore, the commitment is binding, and thus in a later stage when the commitment is opened, it is guaranteed that the "opening" can yield only a single value determined in the committing stage.
For some applications, the above security guarantees are not sufficient and additional properties are required. For instance, the definition of commitments does not rule out the possibility that an adversary, upon seeing a commitment to a specific value Ú, is able to commit to a related value (say, Ú ½), even though it does not know the actual value of Ú. This kind of attack might have devastating consequences if the underlying application relies on the independence of committed values (e.g., consider a case in which the commitment scheme is used for securely implementing a contract bidding mechanism). The state of affairs is even worsened by the fact that many of the known commitment schemes are actually susceptible to this kind of attack.
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Non-Malleable Commitments
In order to address the above concerns, Dolev, Dwork and Naor (DDN) introduced the concept of nonmalleable commitments [12] . Loosely speaking, a commitment scheme is said to be non-malleable if no adversary can succeed in the attack described above. That is, it is infeasible for the adversary to maul a commitment to a value Ú into a commitment to a "related" value Ú.
The first non-malleable commitment protocol was constructed by Dolev, Dwork and Naor [12] . The security of their protocol relies on the existence of one-way functions, and requires Ç´ÐÓ Òµ rounds of interaction, where Ò ¾ AE is a security parameter. A more recent result by Barak presents a constant-round protocol for non-malleable commitment, whose security relies on the existence of trapdoor permutations and hash functions that are collision-resistant against sub-exponential sized circuits [2] . Even more recently, Pass and Rosen present a constant-round protocol for the same task, assuming only collision resistant hash function secure against polynomial sized circuits [32].
Concurrent Non-Malleable Commitments
Unfortunately, the original definition of nonmalleability fails to give any security guarantee when the number of commitments in which the adversary is simultaneously participating exceeds two. Needless to say that this fact severely restricts the usability of nonmalleable commitments, as it effectively implies that no security guarantee is provided once parties run more than one execution of the commitment protocol.
Partially addressing this issue, some works have demonstrated the existence of commitment schemes that remain non-malleable under bounded concurrent composition [30, 3] . That is, for any (predetermined) polynomial Ô´¡µ, there exists a non-malleable commitment that remains secure as long as it is not executed more than Ô´Òµ times, where Ò ¾ AE is a security parameter.
One evident disadvantage of the above solutions is that they require that the number of executions is fixed before the protocol is specified, or otherwise no security guarantee is provided. Less evidently, the length of the messages in these protocols has to grow linearly with the number of executions. Thus, from both a theoretical and a practical point of view, these protocols are still not satisfactory. What we would like to have is a single protocol that preserves its non-malleability even when it is executed concurrently for any (not predetermined) polynomial number of times.
Our Results
We present a new protocol for concurrent nonmalleable commitments. Our protocol remains nonmalleable even when concurrently executed an (unbounded) polynomial number of times. We do not rely on any kind of set-up assumption (such as the existence of a common reference string).
The resulting commitment is statistically binding, and satisfies non-malleability with respect to commitment. The former condition implies that, except with negligible probability, a transcript of a commitment corresponds to a unique value, whereas the latter implies that, upon concurrently participating in polynomially many commitments, both as a receiver and as a sender, the adversary is not able to commit to a sequence of related values. 1 Here we assume that the adversary does not get to see the de-commitment to any of the values he is receiving a commitment to until he is done with committing to all of his values. To the best of our knowledge, this result yields the first instance of a non-trivial protocol that simultaneously satisfies non-malleability and (unbounded) concurrency without having to rely on any set-up assumption. It settles one of the main open problems stated in the DDN paper [12] .
Additional contributions. Our proof also yields the first commitment scheme that is strictly non-malleable with respect to commitment.
2 Strict non-malleability means that the simulation used to prove non-malleability runs in strict (as opposed to expected) polynomial time. This was the security notion originally defined (but not achieved in) the DDN paper [12] .
Our definitions of non-malleable commitments are somewhat different (stronger) than the ones appearing in the DDN paper [12] . Specifically, we formalize the notion of two values being unrelated through the concept of computational indistinguishability (rather than using polynomial time computable relations). The main reason for strengthening the definition is that it yields a notion that is more intuitive and easier to work with (especially in the concurrent setting). We wish to stress that any protocol satisfying our definition also satisfies the original one.
Techniques and ideas. Our construction follows the paradigm introduced by Pass and Rosen (PR), of using a protocol for non-malleable zero-knowledge in order to obtain (single execution) non-malleable commitments [32] . While our construction relies on the same high-level structure, the analysis of the protocol is significantly different. The central observation that enables the analysis is that concurrent simulation of the underlying (non-malleable) zero-knowledge protocol is not actually necessary for proving concurrent non-malleability of our commitments. Indeed, for our analysis to go through, it will be sufficient to simulate only a single execution of the underlying zero-knowledge protocol. This will be performed while concurrently extracting multiple witnesses for the statements proved by the adversary. We call the above property one-many simulation extractability. We prove that this property is indeed satisfied by the non-malleable zero-knowledge protocols of [30, 32] . To show this, we rely on a non-black box simulation argument, which is delicately combined with a black-box extraction technique. (Here we use the fact that concurrent extraction is significantly easier than concurrent simulation (cf. [25] ).)
Related Work
A large body of previous work deals with the construction of non-malleable protocols assuming various kinds of trusted set-up. Known constructions include non-malleable commitment schemes assuming the existence of a common reference string [15, 8] , as well as non-malleable commitment schemes and noninteractive non-malleable Ãprotocols assuming the existence of a common random string [11, 10, 9] . Several of the above works explicitly address the issue of multiple executions of non-malleable schemes [9, 8, 6] (also called reusability in the terminology of [8] ). Perhaps most notable amongst the works addressing concurrency, is the one on Universally composable com-mitments [6] . Universal composability implies concurrent non-malleability. However, it is impossible to construct universally composable commitments without making set-up assumptions [6] .
Other related works involve the task of session-key generation in a setting where the honest parties share a password that is taken from a relatively small dictionary [18, 29, 3] . These protocols are designed having a man-in-the-middle adversary in mind, and only require the usage of a "mild" set-up assumption (namely the existence of a "short" password). Some of these works explicitly address the issue of multiple protocol execution (cf. [18] ), but their treatment is limited to the case of sequential composition. A treatment of the full concurrent case appears in [23] (see also [7, 3] ), but it relies on the existence of a common reference string.
Definitions
We assume familiarity with the standard definitions of zero-knowledge and commitment schemes (see [16] ). Our definitions of non-malleability are somewhat stronger that the ones proposed by DDN [12] . Specifically, we formalize the notion of two values being unrelated through the concept of computational indistinguishability (rather than using polynomial time computable relations).
The General Setting
Let Ê be a commitment scheme and consider a man-in-the-middle adversary that is simultaneously participating in multiple concurrent executions of Ê . Executions in which is playing the role of the receiver are said to belong to the left interaction, whereas executions in which is playing the role of the sender are said to belong to the right interaction. We assume for simplicity, and without loss of generality, that the number of commitment schemes taking place in the left and right interactions is identical. The total number of the interactions in which the adversary is involved (either as a sender or as a receiver) is not a-priori bounded by any polynomial (though it is assumed to be polynomial in the security parameter). We assume that the adversary does not get to see the de-commitment to any of the values he is receiving a commitment to until he is done with committing to all of his values.
Besides controlling the messages that it sends in the left and right interactions, has control over their scheduling. In particular, it may delay the transmission of a message in one interaction until it receives a message (or even multiple messages) in the other interaction.
It can also arbitrarily interleave messages that belong to different executions within an interaction.
The adversary is trying to take advantage of his participation in the commitments taking place in the left interaction in order to violate the security of the commitments executed in the right interaction. The honest sender and receiver are not necessarily aware to the existence of the adversary, and might be under the impression that they are interacting one with the other. We let Ú ½ Ú Ñ denote the values committed to in the left interaction and Ú ½ Ú Ñ denote the values committed to in the right interaction. The above scenario is depicted in Figure 1 (with no explicit demonstration of possible interleavings of messages between different executions).
The traditional definition of non-malleable commitments [12] considers the case when Ñ ½. Loosely speaking, it requires that the left interaction does not "help" the adversary in committing to a value Ú ½ that is somehow correlated with the value Ú ½ . In this work we focus on non-malleability with respect to commitment [12] , where the adversary is said to succeed if it manages to commit to a related value (even without being able to later de-commit to this value). Note that this notion makes sense only in the case of statisticallybinding commitments.
Non-Malleability via Indistinguishability
Following the simulation paradigm [21, 22, 19, 20] , the notion of non-malleability is formalized by comparing between a man-in-the-middle and a simulated execution. In the man-in-the-middle execution the adversary is simultaneously acting as a receiver in one interaction and as a committer in another interaction. In the simulated execution the adversary is engaged in a single interaction where it is acting as a committer.
The original definition of non malleability required that for any polynomial time computable (non-reflexive) relation Ê, the value Ú committed to by the adversary in the simulated execution is no (significantly) less likely to satisfy Ê´Ú Úµ ½ than the value committed to by the adversary in the man-in-the-middle execution [12] .
To facilitate the formalization for Ñ ½, we choose to adopt a slightly different definitional approach and will actually require an even stronger condition (which we are still able to satisfy with our protocol). Specifically, we require that for any adversary in a man-in-themiddle execution, there exists an adversary that commits to essentially the same value in the simulated execution. By essentially the same value, we mean that the value committed to by the simulator is computationally indistinguishable from the value committed to by the adversary in the man-in-the middle execution.
Since copying cannot be ruled out, we will only be interested in the case where copying is not considered success. We therefore impose the condition that whenever the adversary has fully copied a transcript of an interaction in which it acts as a receiver, the value Ú that he has committed to in the corresponding execution is set to be a special "failure" symbol, denoted .
Concurrent Non-Malleable Commitments
Let Ê be a commitment scheme, and let Ò ¾ AE be a security parameter. We consider man-in-the-middle adversaries that are simultaneously participating in left and right interactions in which Ñ ÔÓÐÝ´Òµ commitments take place. We compare between a man-in-themiddle and a simulated execution. 3 If the transcript of the Ø right commitment is identical to the transcript of any of the left interactions (which means that adversary has fully copied a specific commitment that has taken place on the left), the value Ú is set to be . The simulated execution. In the simulated execution a simulator Ë directly interacts with Ê. As in the man-inthe-middle execution, the values Ú ½ Ú Ñ are chosen 3 Since we are dealing with statistically binding commitments, Ú ½ ÚÑ are (almost always) well defined. 4 This approach allows Ú Ú, as long as the man-in-the-middle does not fully copy the messages from one of the left executions. This is in contrast to the original definition which does not handle the case of Ú Ú (as Ê is non-reflexive). This means that the new approach takes into consideration a potentially larger class of attacks.
prior to the interaction and Ë receives some a-priori information about Ú ½ Ú Ñ as part of its an auxiliary input Þ. 
It can be seen that for Ñ ½ any protocol that satisfies Definition 2.1 also satisfies the original (relation based) definition of non-malleability. Loosely speaking, this is because the existence of a polynomial time computable relation Ê that violates the original definition of non-malleability could be used to distinguish between the values of mim ÓÑ´Ú Þµ and sim Ë ÓÑ´Ú Þµ.
High-level Structure of the Proof
As mentioned in the introduction, our construction follows the paradigm introduced by Pass and Rosen (PR) for obtaining (single execution) non-malleable commitments [32] . The commit phase of the PR protocol consists of having the sender engage in a (standard) statistically binding commitment with the receiver and thereafter also provide a non-malleable zero-knowledge proof of knowledge of the value committed to. The reveal phase consists of sending the de-commitment information of the statistically binding commitment used in the commit phase. Our analysis proceeds as follows.
A simple simulator.
We first show that our nonmalleable commitment scheme has the property that the left interaction can be simulated by simply (honestly) committing to ¼ Ò . This is in contrast to previous simulators for non-malleable commitments, which invariably relied on the invocation of a zero-knowledge simulator. Our new, "simple" simulator, naturally extends to the concurrent setting (whereas simulators that relied on zero-knowledge simulations encountered difficulties). This observation alone allows us to obtain a non-malleable commitment that is secure if there are an unbounded number of concurrent left interactions, but only one right interaction.
Simulation-extractability. Next, we show that the commitment scheme is non-malleable when there are an unbounded number of right interactions, but only one left interaction. This is obtained by proving that the zero-knowledge protocols that we use satisfy a, so called, simulation-extractability property in the manin-the-middle setting. By simulation-extractability we mean that there exists a combined simulator-extractor that can simulate both the left and the right interaction for the man-in-the middle adversary, while simultaneously outputting a witness for the statement proved by the adversary in the right interaction. Furthermore, we show that these zero-knowledge protocols also satisfy a "one-many" simulation-extractability property, namely that the simulation-extractability property holds even if there are an unbounded number of concurrent right interactions (while only one left interaction). The proof of this result relies on a novel non-black box simulation argument, which is delicately combined with a blackbox extraction technique. (We note that our method inherently makes use of the "mix" of non-black box and black-box techniques.)
Combining the above ideas. Finally, using a hybrid argument, the above two techniques are combined in order to show that the commitment scheme is non-malleable even when there are an unbounded number of left and right interactions.
A Simulation-Extractable ÃProtocol
The Ãprotocols used in order to enable the above analysis (and ultimately used in order to construct the non-malleable commitment protocol) are constructed in two steps: (1) Construct a family of Ò zero-knowledge protocols Ã Ø that satisfy "one-many" simulationextractability. It turns out that the protocols of Pass [30] in fact satisfy this property. Our main technical contribution consists of proving this fact. (2) Relying on the technique of Pass and Rosen [32] , obtain a family of ¾ Ò protocols which satisfy the same property.
Constructing a family of Ò protocols. We start by reviewing Pass' protocols, Ã Ø , which rely on the zeroknowledge protocol of Barak [1] . (See [1, 30, 32] for a more detailed treatment.) Let Ò ¾ AE, and let Ì AE AE be a "nice" function that satisfies Ì´Òµ Ò ´½µ . Ã Ø relies on a "spe- Similarly to [1] , Ã Ø makes use of a witnessindistinguishable universal argument (Ï Á Í Ê ) [14, 13, 24, 26, 4] . Let Ä be any language in AE È , let Ò ¾ AE, let Ü ¾ ¼ ½ Ò be the common input for the protocol, and let Ø ¾ Ò . Ã Ø is described in Figure 3 . 
Stage 1 (Slot 2):
È Î : Send ¾ = Com(¼ Ò ). Î È : Send Ö¾ R ¼ ½ ´Ñ·½ Ø µ¡ ´Òµ .
Stage 2 (Body of the proof):
È¸Î : A WI UARG È Í Î Í proving the OR of the following three statements: What differentiates between two protocols Ã Ø and Ã Ø is the fact that the length of the verifier's messages in Ã Ø is a parameter that depends on Ø .
The length of these verifier messages is also dictated by the parameter ´Òµ. In our case ´Òµ ¼´Ò µ · Ò, where ¼´Ò µ upper bounds the total length of all prover and verifier messages in Ã Ø , except for the "challenges" Ö ½ Ö ¾ . 5 (Note that although the statement proved in 5 In [30] , ´Òµ was instantiated to a slightly different value in order Stage 2 of the protocol actually depends on the challenges Ö ½ Ö ¾ such an upper bound exists due to the "efficiency" of the Í Ê used.)
Stand-alone zero-knowledge. Our use of Ã Ø relies on the fact that Ã Ø is a stand-alone zero-knowledge proof of knowledge. 6 The stand-alone Ãproperty of Ã Ø follows using essentially the same simulation techniques as Barak's one [1] . The main difference to be taken into consideration is the existence of multiple slots in Stage 1.
We provide a brief sketch of how this simulation, which we refer to as the stand-alone simulation, is performed. In Stage 1 of the protocol (i.e., in Slot 1 and 2), the simulator proceeds by committing to the program of the residual verifier. Let ¥ ½ ¥ ¾ denote the respective programs, and × ½ × ¾ the randomness used for the commitments. In Stage 2 of the protocol, the simulator proves that it committed to the program of the verifier in Slot 1. More precisely, the simulator uses the tuple ¥ ½ ½ × ½ as a witness for ½ Ö ½ ¾ Ä × Ñ (where Ä × Ñ is the language that corresponds to Ê × Ñ ). This is a valid witness, since: (1) by the definition of ¥ ½ it holds that ¥ ½´ ½ µ Ö ½ , and (2) by the choice of ´Òµ, for every Ø ¾ Ñ , Ö ´Òµ Ò. Note that the simulator could have alternatively committed to the program of the verifier in Slot 2. This additional feature will be useful to us in Section 4.1.
Proof of knowledge.
In this paper, just as in [32] , we additionally require that Ã Ø is a proof of knowledge.
That is, for any prover È £ and for any Ü ¾ ¼ ½ Ò , if È £ convinces the honest verifier Î that Ü ¾ Ä with nonnegligible probability then one can extract a witness Û that satisfies Ê Ä´Ü Ûµ ½ in (expected) polynomial time. 
Simulation-Soundness
As shown in [30] , the protocols Ã Ø are simulation-sound with respect to each other, i.e., a manin-the-middle adversary that receives a simulated proof of Ã Ø (as part of its left interaction) will not be able to break the soundness of the protocol Ã Ø (as part of its right interaction), where Ø Ø . We briefly reto guarantee composition with other protocols. In this paper we do not need this additional feature. 6 We mention that Ã Ø is known to be sound only assuming that the family À Ò is collision resistant against Ì´Òµ-sized circuits. Nevertheless, using ideas from [4] , it is possible to show how by slightly modifying the relation Ê × Ñ , one can guarantee soundness under "standard" collision resistance. 7 We note that the weak proof of knowledge property of a Ï ÁÍ Ê is not sufficient for our purposes. To guarantee the "traditional" proof of knowledge property, we have to use a "specialized" version of Ï Á Í Ê s which provides this guarantee (cf. [32] ).
view how this is proved, as this technique will be useful to us. For more details, the reader is referred to [30, 32] . Suppose there exists a man-in-the middle adversary that manages to violate the soundness of protocol Ã Ø , while receiving a simulated proof of Ã Ø . We show how to construct a cheating prover È £ for a single instance of Ã Ø by forwarding 's messages in Ã Ø to an external honest verifier Î and internally simulating the messages of Ã Ø for . One problem that arises is that the code of the external verifier Î is not available to us. This means that the straightforward simulation of the protocol Ã Ø cannot be completed as it is, since it explicitly requires possession of a "short" description of the corresponding verifier messages. To overcome this problem we resort to an alternative simulation technique.
The alternative simulator. Note that except for the "long" challenges Ö ½ Ö ¾ sent by the verifier of Ã Ø we do have a description of all messages sent to the adversary that is shorter than ´Òµ Ò (since ´Òµ ¼´Ò µ·Ò, where ¼´Ò µ upper bounds the total length of both prover and verifier messages, except for the challenges Ö ½ Ö ¾ ). In order to show that we can still perform a simulation, even in the presence of these messages (for which we do not have a short description), we use the fact that it is sufficient to have a short description of the messages sent in one of the slots of Ã Ø . As in [30] , we separate between two different schedulings:
There exist one "free" slot in Ã Ø in which neither of Ö ½ , Ö ¾ are contained. In this case the "free" slot in Ã Ø can be used to perform the straightforward simulation.
The messages Ö ½ Ö ¾ in Ã Ø occur in slot 1, 2 respectively in Ã Ø . By the construction of the protocols it follows that the length of either the first or the second challenge in Ã Ø is at least ´Òµ bits longer than the corresponding challenge in Ã Ø . Thus there exist a slot in Ã Ø such that even if we include the verifier's challenge from the protocol Ã Ø in the description, we still have ´Òµ Ò bits to describe the other messages.
Bounded-concurrent simulation-soundness. As is shown in [30] , the protocols Ã Ø retain both their zero-knowledge and simulation-soundness properties even if the adversary is allowed to participate in an apriori bounded number of concurrent executions. 8 As in [32] , this additional property is useful to us in order to construct a family of ¾ Ò protocols (see Section 4.3 and [32] for more details). 8 We mention that this requires adjusting the length parameter ´Òµ in a way that depends on the a-priori bound.
Simulation-Extractability
Recall that simulation-extractability means that there exists a combined "simulator-extractor" that is able to simulate both the left and the right interaction for a man-in-the-middle adversary, while simultaneously extracting a witness to the statement proved in the right interaction. It has already been shown in [32] that the family Ã Ø is simulation extractable. We show that this family satisfies an even stronger property: It is simulation-extractable even when the adversary participates in an unbounded number of concurrent rightinteractions (while only receiving one left interaction).
Let be a man-in-the middle adversary that is simultaneously participating in one left interaction of Ã Ø , acting as verifier, and an (unbounded) polynomial number of right-interactions of Ã Ø , acting as prover. Let Ú Û ´Ü Þ Ø µ denote the view of ´Ü Þµ when receiving a left-proof of the statement Ü, using tag Ø , and giving right-proofs of statements of its choice and using tags of its choice. 
, which use a different tag than the left interaction).
Proof Sketch: To simplify the proof we assume that Ã Ø is perfect zero-knowledge. This extra assumption will be lifted at the end of the proof.
Consider a man-in-the-middle adversary . Let denote the number of rounds in Ã Ø , and let Ñ be an upper-bound on the number of right interactions that participates in. We describe a combined simulatorextractor Ë which proceeds as follows:
Simulation of view. We start by describing a machine SIM that simulates the view of . This implies simulating all the left and the right interactions for . Note that in the right interactions SIM is supposed to act as a verifier and can therefore "emulate" those executions by acting as the honest verifier. In the left interaction, on the other hand, SIM is supposed to act as a prover and has to perform a "real" simulation. Towards this goal, SIM performs the following modified version of the stand-alone simulator. Whereas the stand-alone simulator would have committed to ¥´¡µ, we instead let SIM commit to the program ¥ ¼´ ¡µ defined as follows: it executes ¥´¡µ if ¼ and otherwise executes the same code as ¥´¡µ with the exception that messages in the Ø right interaction are not emulated, rather ¥´ ¡µ will expect to receive these (external) messages as input.
Thereafter, SIM proceeds exactly as the stand-alone simulator, by additionally letting the input to ¥ ¼ be set to 0, in stage 2 of the protocol. Note that the additional input to ¥ ¼ is thus not used in the simulation. However, the possibility of using this additional input will facilitate the task of extracting witnesses.
Extraction of witnesses.
Once the view of has been simulated, we turn to the extraction of witnesses to the statements proved by . Note that we need to extract witnesses to all concurrent right interactions. Towards this goal we rely on a variant of Lindell's concurrent extraction technique [25] , combined with the alternative simulator technique described in Section 4.1. In a sense, this can be seen as a (non-trivial) extension of the method of Pass and Rosen [32] (which was used to show a similar property for the significantly simpler case of only one right interaction).
More precisely, we describe a machine EXT that proceeds as follows. EXT fixes the random coins of the simulator SIM and iteratively extracts witnesses for each of the right interactions. More precisely, for each ¾ Ñ such that the Ø right interaction was accepting in the simulation by SIM (with fixed random coins), and the tag of the Ø interaction is different from the tag of the left interaction, perform the following steps (note that otherwise we do not need to extract a witness):
Construct a stand-alone prover È for the Ø right interaction as follows. Perform the same simulation of the left and the right interactions for as was done by SIM (using the same fixed random coins), except for the fol-lowing differences:
(1) Messages in the Ø right interaction are no longer emulated internally, but forwarded externally.
(2) In the simulation of the left protocol, use the alternative simulator from Section 4.1 in order to complete stage 2 of the protocol. Note that the stand-alone simulator no longer can be used since the simulator has not (and cannot) commit to the external messages for the Ø left interaction. On the other hand, since there is only one external interaction the alternative simulator will succeed. The only change needed to the alternative simulator is that we additionally provide the input to ¥ ¼ , in order to let ¥ ¼ depend on the external messages in interaction (since this input is "short" the simulation still succeeds).
We can now apply the (stand-alone) extractor, guaranteed by the proof of knowledge property of Ã Ø , to È in order to extract a witness. In order to simplify the analysis, we consider an extractor that proceeds by feeding (truly) random coins to È until it obtains another accepting transcript using the same prefix (note that we only start the extraction in the case that the simulation by SIM resulted in an accepting transcript).
In the unlikely event when we obtain two accepting transcripts using the same random challenges (in Stage 2 of the protocol), the extractor outputs fail (note that this only happens if the coins sent by the extractor are the same as the coins sent by SIM).
The output of Ë. Finally the combined simulatorextractor Ë outputs Ð whenever EXT does so. Otherwise, Ë outputs whatever SIM outputs, followed by whatever EXT outputs.
Correctness of the simulation-extraction. A proof of the correctness of the above simulator Ë can be found in the full version. There it is also shown how the above (simplified) combined simulator-extractor can be modified to work even if only assuming that Ã Ø is statistical zero-knowledge and not perfect zero-knowledge. We hint that this is done by relying on a variant of the sampling technique from [17] .
Constructing a Family of ¾ Ò Protocols
We show how to extend the family of Ò protocols Ã Ø Ø ¾ Ò into a family of ¾ Ò protocols that satisfy the one-many simulation-extractability property. One approach for obtaining this is to rely on an "Ò-slot" version of Ã Ø (i.e., using Ò "slots" instead of only 2, see [30] for more details). The proof of one-many simulation-extractability from Section 4.2 directly extends to this new (non-constant round) protocol.
Pass and Rosen [32] , instead show how to obtain a family of ¾ Ò constant-round protocols by running Ò parallel executions of Ã Ø , using appropriately chosen tags. This new family of protocols is denoted ÒÑ Ã Ø Ø ¾ ¼ ½ Ò and is depicted in Figure 4 . In the full version of the paper, we show how to modify the combined simulator-extractor from section 4.2 to prove that ÒÑ Ã Ø is one-many simulation-extractable. Just as in [32] , we here rely on the bounded-concurrent security of 
Non-Malleable Commitments
Using ÒÑ Ã Ø as a subroutine, we present a construction of concurrent non-malleable commitments.
Let ÓÑ be a statistically binding commitment scheme (for simplicity, assume that ÓÑ is non-interactive), and let´ Ò Ë Ò Î Ö Ýµ be a one-time signature scheme secure against a chosen-message attack. Consider the following protocol for non-malleable commitments (which is a variant of the non-malleable commitment of Pass and Rosen [32] ). 10 The statistical binding property of ÒÑ follows from the statistical binding of Com. The computational hiding property follows from the computational hiding of Com, as well as from the (stand alone) Ã property of ÒÑ Ã Ø (see [32] of more details). It remains to show that ÒÑ is concurrently non-malleable.
Theorem 5.1 ÒÑ is concurrently non-malleable.
Proof: Consider a man-in-the-middle adversary that, given access to Ñ commitments to the values Ú ½ Ú Ñ , succeeds in committing to values Ú ½ Ú Ñ . We show that for every such adversary , there exists a simulator Ë (which only participates in right interactions), that manages to commit to values that are indistinguishable from Ú ½ Ú Ñ . The simulator Ë incorporates , and internally emulates the left interactions for by simply 9 In fact, since the protocols Ã Ø are all run in parallel in ÒÑ ÃØ , "bounded-parallel" security is here sufficient. 10 The difference between the this protocol and the protocol of [32] is that here we also employ a signature scheme. We note that the important difference, nevertheless, lies in the analysis of the protocol. Proof Sketch: The claim follows from the statistical indistinguishability property of the combined simulatorextractor which is used by À (see [32] for a more formal proof of a similar statement). Note that since the values committed to are not efficiently computable from 11 In case that the commitment ÓÑ can be opened to two different strings, we set the value of this commitment to . 12 What we actually show is a somewhat stronger property than nonmalleability. Namely, that the values that the man-in-the-middle adversary commits to are (computationally) independent of the values he receives commitments to. It only remains to analyze what happens to rightcommitments that use the same verification key as the left-commitment, but different transcripts. In this case, the values committed to are not extracted. However, based on the unforgeability of the signature scheme, this event only happens with negligible probability. 13 Now, define the machine À ·½ which proceeds just as À except that À ·½ internally emulates the Ø leftinteraction by sending a commitment (using ÓÑ) to ¼ Ò in the first message of ÒÑ (instead of Ú as À would), before executing the combined simulator-extractor. It follows from the computationally hiding property of ÓÑ that the values output by À and À ·½ are computationally indistinguishable.
14 (Recall that both À and À ·½ , not only output commitments, but also the actual values that these are commitments to.) Finally, it follows from the statistical indistinguishability property of (the combined simulator-extractor for) ÒÑ Ã Ø that the values committed to by À ·½ (which in turn are statistically close to the values output by À ·½ ) are indistinguishable from the values committed to by À ·½ . We conclude that the values committed to by À and À ·½ are indistinguishable, which contradicts our assumptions. 13 Note that even though the adversary has only seen one signed message using Ú , we still need to rely on signature scheme that is secure against a chosen message attack. This follows from the fact that the adversary can influence the choice of this message (since the message is the transcript of the interaction).
14 Otherwise we could distinguish between commitments (using ÓÑ) to ¼ Ò and Ú .
